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Abstract
How should monetary authorities react to an oil price shock? The New Keyne-
sian literature has concluded that ensuring complete price stability is the optimal
thing to do. In contrast, this paper argues that a meaningful trade-oﬀ between
stabilizing inﬂation and the welfare relevant output gap arises in a distorted
economy once one recognizes (i) that oil (energy) cannot be easily substituted
by other factors in the short-run, (ii) that there is no ﬁscal transfer available to
policymakers to neutralize the steady-state distortion due to monopolistic com-
petition, and (iii) that increases in oil prices also directly aﬀect consumption by
raising the price of fuel, heating oil, and other energy sources. While the ﬁrst two
conditions are necessary to introduce a microfounded monetary policy trade-oﬀ,
the third one makes it quantitatively signiﬁcant.
The optimal precommitment monetary policy relies on unobservables and is
therefore hard to implement. To address this concern, I derive a simple interest
rate feedback rule that mimics the optimal plan in all relevant dimensions but
that depends only on observables, namely core inﬂation, oil price inﬂation, and
the growth rate of output.
Keywords: optimal monetary policy, oil shocks, divine coincidence, simple
rules
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In the last ten years a new macroeconomic paradigm has emerged centered around
t h eN e wK e y n e s i a n( N Kh e n c e f o r t h )m o d e l ,w h i c hi sa tt h ec o r eo ft h em o r ei n v o l v e d
and detailed dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used for policy
analysis at many central banks. Despite its apparent simplicity, the NK model has solid
theoretical foundations and has therefore been used to draw normative conclusions on
the appropriate response of monetary policy to economic shocks.
One result that stands out is that optimal monetary policy should aim at replicating
the real allocation under ﬂexible prices and wages, or natural output, which features
constant markups and no inﬂation. In the case of an oil price shock, the canonical NK
prescription to policymakers is then fairly simple. Central banks must perfectly stabi-
lize inﬂation,1 even if that leads to large drops in output and employment. Because
the latter are considered eﬃcient, monetary policy should focus on minimizing inﬂa-
tion volatility. There is a "divine coincidence,"2 i.e., an absence of trade-oﬀ between
stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing the "welfare relevant" output gap.
The contrast between theory and practice is striking, however. When confronted
with rising commodity prices, policymakers in inﬂation-targeting central banks do in-
deed perceive a trade-oﬀ. They typically favor a long run approach to price stability
by avoiding second-round eﬀects – where wage inﬂation aﬀects inﬂation expectations
and ultimately leads to upward spiralling inﬂation – but by letting ﬁrst-round eﬀects
play out.
So why the diﬀerence? Do policymakers systematically conduct irrational, subop-
timal policies? Or should we reconsider some of the assumptions embedded in the
NK model? In a recent paper, Blanchard and Galí (2007) (henceforth BG07) argued
that dropping the assumption of perfectly ﬂexible real w a g e sd r i v e sat i m e - v a r y i n g
wedge between natural and eﬃcient output (i.e., the undistorted level of output that
would prevail in the absence of nominal frictions in a perfectly competitive economy).
Therefore, stabilizing prices – which amounts to targeting the natural level of output
–i n t r o d u c e si n e ﬃcient output variations and the divine coincidence does not hold
1As noted by Galí (2008 chapter 6), diﬀerent assumptions on nominal rigidities give rise to diﬀerent
deﬁnitions of target inﬂation. Goodfriend and King (2001) and Aoki (2001) argue that monetary policy
should stabilize the stickiest price. By introducing sticky wages alongside sticky prices, Erceg et al.
(2000) and Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2008) ﬁnd that optimal monetary policy should perfectly
stabilize a weighted average of core prices and (negative) wage inﬂation.
2The expression is from Blanchard and Galí (2007).
1anymore.
In this paper, I focus on an alternative explanation that does not hinge on real
rigidities but on the speciﬁcation of technology and its interaction with the assump-
tion of monopolistic competition, standard in NK models. The canonical NK model
relies on the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions. Cobb-Douglas pro-
duction functions greatly simplify the analysis and permit nice closed-form solutions,
but because they assume a unitary elasticity of substitution between factors they fea-
ture constant cost shares over the cycle regardless of the degree of market distortion.
A 1-percent increase in the relative price of a factor immediately leads to a 1-percent
decrease in its relative use. Yet, the case for a unitary elasticity between oil and other
factors is not particularly compelling, especially at business cycle frequency.3 When
oil is considered a gross complement to other factors, at least in the short run, the
response of output to an oil price shock will depend on the degree of market distortion
in the economy, which typically varies with the extent of ﬁrms’ monopolistic power in
NK models. The larger the distortion, the more important is the impact of a given oil
price shock on the oil cost share – and therefore on output – in the ﬂexible price and
wages equilibrium. Like in BG07, this creates a time-varying wedge between the nat-
ural (distorted) and the eﬃcient levels of output, which implies that strictly stabilizing
inﬂation in the face of an oil price shock is no longer the optimal policy to follow.4
The ﬁrst contribution of this paper is to show that increases in oil prices lead to a
meaningful monetary policy trade-oﬀ once it is acknowledged (i) that oil cannot easily
be substituted by other factors5 in the short run, (ii)t h a tt h e r ei sn oﬁscal transfer
available to policymakers to neutralize the steady-state distortion due to monopolistic
competition, and (iii)t h a to i li sa ni n p u tb o t ht op r o d u ction and to consumption (via
the impact of the price of crude oil on the prices of gasoline, heating oil, and electricity).
While the ﬁrst two conditions are necessary to introduce a microfounded monetary
policy trade-oﬀ, they are not suﬃcient to explain the policymakers’ concern for the
real activity consequences of oil price shocks. Hence, this paper stresses that perfectly
3A voluminous empirical literature (Hughes et al., 2008) has documented the fact that the share
of oil (or gasoline) in production and expenditures is highly correlated with its price. In other words,
it is diﬃcult to substitute oil in the short run.
4Monetary authorities can aim at a higher level of welfare by trading some of the costs of ineﬃcient
output ﬂuctuations against the distortion resulting from more inﬂation, which is in line with the general
theory of the second best (see Lipsey and Lancaster, 1956).
5This issue has also been considered in the recent analysis of Montoro (2007) and Castillo et al.
(2007) in an "oil-in-production-only" framework where oil is a gross complement to labor.
2stabilizing inﬂation becomes particularly costly when the impact of higher oil prices
on households’ overall consumption is also taken into account. In a nutshell, changes
in oil prices directly aﬀect the cost of consumption, andt h e na c ta sad i s t o r t i o n a r y
tax on labor income. The lower the elasticity of substitution between energy and
other consumption goods, the larger is the tax eﬀect, and the more detrimental are the
consequences on employment and output of a given increase in oil prices.
One problem with utility-based optimal policies is that they rely on unobservables,
such as the eﬃcient level of output or various shadow prices. This makes them diﬃcult
to communicate and to implement. The second contribution of this paper is to propose
a simple interest rate rule that mimics the optimal plan in all relevant dimensions but
relies only on observables: core inﬂation, oil price inﬂation, and the growth rate of
output.6 Interestingly, I ﬁnd that the optimal monetary policy response to a persistent
increase in oil price resembles the typical response of inﬂation targeting central banks.
While long-term price stability is ensured by a credible commitment to stabilize inﬂa-
tion and inﬂation expectations, short-term real rates drop right after the shock to help
dampen real output ﬂuctuations. By managing expectations eﬃciently, central banks
can improve on both the ﬂexible price equilibrium solution and the recommendation
of simple Taylor rules.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I start by building a two-
sector NK model where oil enters as an input to both production and consumption in
a low elasticity CES framework, and which, therefore, features both core and headline
inﬂation. Section 3 solves a log-linearized version of the model in the ﬂexible price
and wage equilibrium and shows that the cost-push shock leading to the monetary
policy trade-oﬀ is increasing in the degree of steady-state distortion and is inversely
related to the elasticities of substitution, both at the production and the consumption
level. In Section 4, I derive an analytical linear-quadratic solution to the optimal policy
problem in a timeless perspective. I show that the optimal weight on inﬂa t i o ni nt h e
policymaker’s loss function decreases with the production elasticity of substitution and
increases with the degree of real wage and nominal price stickiness. Section 5 derives
a simple implementable interest rate feedback rule that replicates the optimal plan.
Oil shocks are rare but costly events. To give a sense of the costs incurred by follow-
ing suboptimal monetary policies, Section 6 revisits the 1979 oil shock and computes
6See Orphanides and Willliams (2003) for a thorough discussion of implementable monetary policy
rules.
3the welfare losses associated with alternative policy rules. I reckon that following a
Taylor rule instead of the optimal precommitment policy could have cost the United
States 2.1 percent of one year’s consumption (or about 200 billions dollars in terms of
2008 private consumption).
Finally, as the long run price elasticity of oil demand is deemed much higher than
its short-run counterpart7, Section 7 shows that this paper’s ﬁndings are robust to a
production framework that assumes gross complementarity in the short run but gross
substitutability in the long run, in the spirit of "putty-clay" models of energy use.8
Section 8 summarizes the main ﬁndings and sketches directions for future research.
2 The model
Following Bodenstein, Erceg and Guerrieri (2008) (thereafter BEG08), I assume a two-
layer closed-economy setting9 composed of a core consumption good, which takes labor
and oil as inputs, and a consumption basket consisting of the core consumption good
and oil. In order to keep the notations as simple as possible, there is only one source
of nominal rigidity in this economy: core goods prices10 are sticky and ﬁrms set prices
according to a Calvo scheme.
In contrast to BEG08, however, I relax the assumption of a unitary elasticity of
substitution between oil and other goods and factors. I also explicitly consider a
distorted economy: there is no ﬁscal transfer to neutralize the monopolistic competition
distortion.
2.1 Households
There exists a unit mass continuum of inﬁnitely lived households indexed by j ∈ [0,1],

















7See Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983) for an empirical investigation.
8See Atkeson and Kehoe (1999).
9This assumption allows one to ignore income distribution and international risk-sharing related
issues.
10Introducing nominal wage stickiness would not change the thrust of the argument. As shown by
Woodford (2003) and Gali (2008), one can always deﬁne a composite index of wage and price inﬂation
such that there is no trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the composite index and the welfare-relevant output
gap in the canonical NK model.
4where Ct (j) is the consumption goods bundle, Ht (j) is the (normalized) quantity of
hours supplied by household of type j, the constant discount factor β satisﬁes 0 <β<1
and ν is a parameter calibrated to ensure that the typical household works eight hours
a day in steady state.
In each period, the representative household j faces a standard ﬂow budget con-
straint
PtBt (j)+PtCt (j)=Rt−1Bt−1 (j)+WtHt (j)+e Πt (j)+Tt (j),( 2 )
where Bt (j) is a non-state-contingent one period bond, Rt is the nominal gross interest
rate, Pt is the CPI, e Πt (j) is the household j share of the ﬁrms’ dividends and Tt (j) is
a lump sum ﬁscal transfer to the household of the proﬁts from sovereign oil extraction
activities.
Because the labor market is perfectly competitive, I drop the index j such that
Ht ≡ Ht (j)=
R 1
0 Ht (j)dj, and I write the consumption goods bundle11 Ct as a CES














where ωoc is the oil quasi-share parameter and χ is the elasticity of substitution between
oil and non-oil consumption goods.
Households determine their consumption, savings, and labor supply decisions by









which characterizes the optimal intertemporal allocation of consumption and where Πt
represents headline inﬂation.
Allowing for real wage rigidity (which may reﬂect some unmodeled imperfection in
the labor market as in BG07), the labor supply condition relates the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure to the geometric mean of real wages in
















11The consumption basket can be regarded as produced by perfectly competitive consumption
distributors whose production function mirrors the preferences of households over consumption of
oil and non-oil goods.
5In the benchmark calibration, i.e., unless stated otherwise, η =0 ;r e a lw a g e sa r e
perfectly ﬂexible and equal to the marginal rate of substitution between labor and
consumption in all periods.
Finally, households optimally divide their consumption expenditures between core
and oil consumption according to the following demand equations:
CY,t = P
−χ
y,t (1 − ωoc)








Pt is the relative price of the core consumption good and Po,t ≡
PO,t
Pt is













represents the overall consumer price index (CPI).
2.2 Firms
2.2.1 Core goods producers
I assume that the core consumption good is produced by a continuum of perfectly
competitive producers indexed by c ∈ [0,1] that use a set of imperfectly substitutable











where ε is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods. Given the indi-
vidual intermediate goods prices, PY,t(i), cost minimization by core goods producers













is the core price index.
Aggregating (10) over all core goods ﬁrms, the total demand for intermediate goods






Yt,( 1 1 )
6using the fact that perfect competition in the market for core goods implies Yt (c) ≡
Yt =
R 1
0 Yt (c)dc .
2.2.2 Intermediate goods ﬁrms
Each intermediate goods ﬁrm produces a good Yt (i) according to a constant returns-
to-scale technology represented by the CES production function
Yt (i)=
³
(1 − ωoy)(HtHt (i))
δ−1





,( 1 2 )
where Ht is the exogenous Harrod-neutral technological progress whose value is nor-
malized to one, for I am here only interested in the dynamic response of the economy
to an oil price shock. OY,t(i) and Ht (i) are the quantities of oil and labor required to
produce Yt (i) given the quasi-share parameters, ωoy, and the elasticity of substitution
between labor and oil, δ.
Each ﬁrm i operates under perfect competition in the factor markets and determines







OY,t(i),( 1 3 )
subject to the production function (12) for given Wt, PY,t,a n dPO,t. Their demands















oyYt (i),( 1 5 )
where the real marginal cost in terms of core consumption goods units is given by
















.( 1 6 )
2.2.3 Price setting
Final goods producers operate under perfect competition and therefore take the price
level PY,t as given. In contrast, intermediate goods producers operate under monopo-
listic competition and face a downward-sloping demand curve for their products, whose
price elasticity is positively related to the degree of competition in the market. They
7set prices so as to maximize proﬁts following a sticky price setting scheme à la Calvo.
Each ﬁrm contemplates a ﬁxed probability θ of not being able to change its price next




















e Πt,t+n (i)=PY,t(i)Yt+n (i) − MCt+nP
Y
t+nYt+n (i).




















































Since only a fraction (1 − θ) of the intermediate goods ﬁrms are allowed to reset their
prices every period while the remaining ﬁrms update them according to the steady-
state inﬂation rate (which is optimally zero in the present context), it can be shown
that the overall core price index dynamics is given by the following equation
(PY,t)
1−ε = θ(PY,t−1)





Following Benigno and Woodford (2005), I rewrite equation (18) in terms of the
core inﬂation rate ΠY,t
θ(ΠY,t)

































To close the model, I assume that oil is extracted with no cost by the government,
which sells it to the households and the ﬁrms and transfers the proceeds in a lump
sum fashion to the households. I abstract from any other role for the government and
assume that it runs a balanced budget in each and every period so that its budget
constraint is simply given by
Tt = PO,tOt,
for Ot the total amount of oil supplied.
2.4 Market clearing and aggregation
In equilibrium, goods, oil, and labor markets clear. In particular, given the assumption










Ht (j)dj ≡ Ht.
Because I assume that the real price of oil Po,t is exogenous in the model, the
government supplies all demanded quantities at the posted price. The oil market







for Ot the total amount of oil supplied.
As there is no net aggregate debt in equilibrium,
Z 1
0
Bt (j)dj = Bt =0 ,
we can consolidate the government’s and the household’s budget constraints to get the
overall resource constraint
CY,t = Yt.
Finally, Calvo price setting implies that in a sticky price equilibrium there is no
simple relationship between aggregate inputs and aggregate output, i.e., there is no















, I follow Yun (1996) and














t ,( 2 0 )






=1 PY,t(r)=PY,t(s), all r = s.
The ineﬃciency distortion P∗
t is related to the rate of core inﬂation ΠY,t by making




































For the sake of comparability, the model calibration closely follows BEG08. The quar-
terly discount factor β is set at 0.993, which is consistent with an annualized real
interest rate of 3 percent. The consumption utility function is chosen to be logarithmic
(σ =1 ) and the Frish elasticity of labor supply is set to unity (φ =1 ).
In the baseline calibration, I set the consumption, χ, and production, δ,o i le l a s t i c -
ities of substitution at 0.3, a low number that corresponds to the average of estimates
found in the empirical literature. Following BEG08, ωoc is set such that the energy
component of consumption (gasoline and fuel plus gas and electricity) equals 6 percent,
which is in line with US NIPA data, and ωoy is chosen such that the share of energy in
production is 2 percent.
Prices are assumed to have a duration of four quarters, so that θ =0 .75.T h ec o r e
goods elasticity of substitution parameters ε is set to 6, which implies a 20 percent
markup of (core) prices over marginal costs.
Finally, the logarithm of the real price of oil in terms of the consumption goods
bundle pot =l o g ( Po,t) is supposed to follow a persistent AR(1) process (ρo =0 .95).
103 Divine coincidence?
Because of monopolistic competition in intermediate goods markets, the economy’s
steady state is distorted. Production and employment are suboptimally low. Fully ac-
knowledging this feature of the economy instead of subsidizing it away for convenience,
as is often done, entails important consequences for optimal policy.
In particular, the divine coincidence breaks down when Cobb-Douglas production
is replaced by CES. Cobb-Douglas production functions greatly simplify the analysis
and permit nice closed-form solutions, but because they assume a unitary elasticity of
substitution between factors they feature constant cost shares over the cycle regardless
of the degree of market distortion. In a nutshell, when oil is considered a gross comple-
ment to labor in production, the oil price elasticity of real marginal costs is increasing
in the oil cost share, which depends on the economy overall distortion. The less com-
petitive the economy, the larger is the steady-state share of oil, and the more sensitive
are real marginal costs to increases in oil prices. Because perfect price stability is the
result of constant real marginal costs, the more distorted the economy, the bigger is the
real wage (and then labor demand and output) drop required to compensate for higher
oil prices. As in BG07, the drop in natural output is not eﬃcient, which introduces a
cost push shock in the NK Phillips curve (as shown in Section 4) and a trade-oﬀ for
monetary policy.
Moreover, this section shows that perfectly stabilizing inﬂation becomes particularly
costly when the impact of higher oil prices on households’ overall consumption is also
taken into account. As stated in the introduction, increases in oil prices act as a tax
on labor income; the lower the elasticity of substitution, the larger the tax eﬀect which
compounds with the production eﬀect on marginal costs and ampliﬁes the trade-oﬀ
faced by monetary authorities.
3.1 Flexible price and wage equilibrium (FPWE)
Before analyzing, in the next sub-section, how the wedge between eﬃcient and natural
output reacts to an oil price shock, I ﬁrst describe the properties of the system at the
FPWE in the log-linearized economy (see Appendix IV for details). Note that lowercase
letters denote the percent deviation of each variable with respect to its steady state






Solving the system for mct =0(because MCt = MC in the FPWE) and assuming
11σ =1and η =0for simplicity, I get
ht = −
∙














f ωoy (1 − f ωoc)+f ωoc




(1−j ωoc)(φ+1) , Λ =( 1− f ωoy)(1− f ωoc)(φ +1 ) , 0 <M C≡ ε−1
ε < 1,a n d






is the share of oil in the real marginal cost, f ωoc ≡ ωχ
ocP1−χ
o





χ i st h es h a r eo ft h ec o r eg o o d
in the consumption goods basket.
Looking at equations (21), (22) and (23), we ﬁrst see that the response of em-
ployment, output and the real wage will depend on f ωoy, the oil price elasticity of real
marginal costs (see equation (A43) in Appendix IV), which is itself a function of the
elasticity of substitution, δ, and the steady-state markup, 1
MC.T h el o w e rδ and MC,
the larger are f ωoy and the eﬀect of changes in oil prices on real wages, employment and
output.
Second, equation (21) shows that when δ = χ =1 , which occurs when the pro-
duction functions for intermediate and ﬁnal goods are Cobb-Douglas, substitution and
income eﬀects compensate one another on the labor market and employment is constant
after an oil price shock (Θ = ht =0 ).
Third, assuming imperfect substitution between oil and other consumption goods
ampliﬁes the responses of both employment and output to the shock as Θ is decreasing,
and Λ is increasing in the elasticity of substitution between oil and other consumption
goods, χ. As stated in the introduction, increases in oil prices act as a tax on labor
income when χ<1; the lower the elasticity of substitution, the larger the tax eﬀect
which compounds with the eﬀect on marginal costs. Note that the tax eﬀect tends
to zero when the elasticity of substitution χ →∞as in this case, f ωoc → 0,a n dt h e
solution of the model collapses to the one when oil is an input to production only.
123.2 Analyzing the cyclical wedge between eﬃcient and natural
output12
To analyze the cyclical wedge between the natural and eﬃcient levels of output after
an oil price shock, it suﬃces to compare the log-linearized, ﬂex-price output responses
in the distorted (natural), yN
t , and undistorted (eﬃcient) y∗
t economies .














where I assume MC =1in f ωoy
∗ and Λ∗ .
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that the wedge is constant (yN
t −y∗
t =0 )a n dt h ed i v i n e
coincidence holds when a ﬁscal transfer is available to oﬀset the steady state distortion.
In this case, f ωoy
N = f ωoy
∗ and ΛN = Λ∗. There is no cost-push shock and then no policy
trade-oﬀ.
Second, when production functions are Cobb-Douglas (δ = χ =1 ), f ωoy
∗ = f ωoy
N =
ωoy and f ωoc = ωoc so that f ωoy
N/ΛN − f ωoy
∗/Λ∗ =0and there is again no-trade-
oﬀ. Cobb-Douglas production implies constant cost shares regardless of the degree
of steady-state distortion. Therefore, the ﬂex-price reaction of output, which implies




Third, allowing for low substitutability in a world without ﬁscal transfer, yN
t will
drop more than y∗
t after an oil shock as f ωoy
N/ΛN > f ωoy
∗/Λ∗ because MCN <MC ∗ =1 .
Clearly, the lower δ and the larger the steady-state distortion (the lower MCN), the
larger is the cyclical wedge between yN
t and y∗
t. Perfectly stabilizing prices (by aiming
at yN
t in each and every period) requires relatively large drops in real wages that arise
out of large drops in labor demand and output in equilibrium.
Looking more closely at equation (24), one notices that the elasticity of substitution
between energy and other consumption goods, χ, plays an important role in amplifying
the eﬀect of oil prices on the gap between yN
t and y∗
t:t h el o w e rχ,t h el o w e ri sPy and
the larger are f ωoc and the ampliﬁcation eﬀect.
This result can be quite easily understood. Accounting for the direct eﬀect of
an increase in oil prices on headline inﬂation creates a discrepancy between real oil
12In the NK model, the social planner’s eﬃcient allocation is the same as the one in the decentralized
economy when prices and wages are ﬂexible and there is no steady-state distortion (MC =1 ). The
natural allocation, on the other hand, corresponds to the ﬂex-price and wage equilibrium in a distorted
economy (MC <1).
13prices faced by consumers, pot, and (higher) real oil prices faced by ﬁrms (pot −pyt).13
Moreover, this distortion is compounded by the fact that the real wage pocketed by
households (the consumption real wage wt) is lower than the real wage faced by ﬁrms
(the production real wage wt − pyt). The lower the elasticity of substitution between
energy and other consumption goods, χ, the larger is the eﬀe c to fag i v e ni n c r e a s ei n
oil prices on pyt and the larger is the requ i r e dd r o pi nr e a lw a g e swt (and output) to
stabilize real marginal costs.
Figure 1 shows the instantaneous response of the gap between natural (YN) and
eﬃcient (Y∗) output (as deﬁned in equation (24)) to a (one period) 1-percent increase
in the real price of oil as a function of δ, the production elasticity of substitution,
and for diﬀerent values of the consumption elasticity of substitution, χ.14 The gap is
exponentially decreasing in both the elasticities δ and χ. Looking at the northeastern
extreme of the ﬁgure, where both elasticities are equal to one (the Cobb-Douglas case),
we see that the reaction of natural and eﬃc i e n to u t p u t sa r et h es a m e ,t h eg a pi sz e r o .
Stabilizing inﬂation or output at its natural level is welfare maximizing. Lowering the
production elasticity only (along the curve CHI=1) gives rise to a monetary policy
trade-oﬀ15. Yet, the wedge becomes really large when both the consumption and
production elasticity are compounded (like on the curve labeled CHI=0.3).
< Figure 1 >
Figure 2 performs a similar exercise, but varies the degree of net steady-state
markups ( 1
MC − 1)f o rd i ﬀerent values of the elasticities δ and χ. Again, the wedge
between eﬃcient and natural output swells for large distortions and low elasticities.
< Figure 2 >
4 Optimal monetary policy
What weight should the central bank attribute to inﬂation over output gap stabiliza-
tion? Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) and Benigno and Woodford (2005) have shown
13Because immediatly after an increase in oil prices, the ratio core to headline prices deteriorates
(pyt < 0).
14Note that the amplitude of the gap also depends on the Frish-elasticity of labor supply as measured
by 1
φ. The smaller φ (the larger the elasticity), the larger are the labor demand and output drops
needed to stabilize the real marginal cost, and the larger is the cyclical gap between eﬃcient and
natural output.
15Recal that the cyclical gap between eﬀcient and natural output drives the cost-push shock in the
New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC, see section 4), and as such governs the trade-oﬀ faced by
monetary policy.
14that the central bank’s loss function could be derived from the households utility func-
tion, thereby setting a natural criterion to answer this question. Indeed, it is possible
to reformulate the central bank’s optimal strategy of maximizing household utility into
the equivalent problem (to a second order of approximation) of minimizing a quadratic
loss function deﬁned as a weighted sum of inﬂation and the welfare relevant output
gap. Therefore, the importance of inﬂation stabilization over output gap stabiliza-
tion depends explicitly on preferences and technology parameters (see Appendix I for
details).
Following Woodford (2003), I deﬁne optimal policy as the optimal precommitment









subject to the sequence of constraints πy,t =
βEtπy,t+1+kyxt+μt (and a constraint on the initial inﬂation rate), where πy,t is the core
inﬂation rate, xt is the welfare relevant output gap xt = yt −y∗






is the cost push shock that depends on the gap between eﬃcient and natural output
(see Appendix II for details).
In Section 4.1, I show that the parameters governing the nominal and real rigidities
in the model interact with the elasticities of substitution (that we assume smaller
than one) and have important consequences on the choice of policy. For reasonable
parameters, however, the weight on inﬂation stabilization remains larger than the one
on the output gap, a result also obtained by Woodford (2003) in a more constrained
environment. Section 4.2 contrasts the dynamic transmission of oil price shocks under
strict inﬂation targeting and under optimal policy16, and shows the importance for
optimal policy of assuming Cobb-Douglas technology.
4.1 Lambda
Figure 3 describes the variation of λ, the relative weight assigned to output gap stabi-
lization as a function of the elasticity of substitution δ and the degree of price stickiness
θ. Stickier prices (larger θ) result in larger price dispersion and therefore larger inﬂa-
tion costs. In this case, monetary authorities will be less inclined to stabilize output
and, for given elasticities of substitution, λ decreases when θ becomes larger. But λ
16Note that when solving for the optimal precommitment policy, I implicitly assume that the central
bank can choose the levels of output gap and inﬂation that would maximize households welfare. Of
course, in practice, central banks do not set any of these variables directly but adjust their policy
instrument (typically the short-term interest rate) until the required optimal relation between the
welfare relevant variables is attained given the IS and NKPC constraints.
15also depends crucially on the elasticities of substitution. The lower the elasticities,
the larger is the cost-push shock, and the ﬂatter is the New Keynesian Phillips curve
(NKPC), which implies a relatively large sacriﬁce ratio.17 With a large cost-push shock
and a large sacriﬁce ratio, the central bank will be more concerned with the distor-
tionary cost of inﬂation and λ will be smaller. Assuming perfectly ﬂexible real wages
(η =0 ), our baseline calibration (θ =0 .75, δ =0 .3)l e a d st oλ =0 .028,w h i c hi m -
plies a targeting rule that places a larger weight on inﬂation stabilization than on the
output gap (in annual inﬂation terms, the ratio output gap to inﬂation stabilization is
√
0.022 × 4=0 .59).18 Note that the focus of policy is very sensitive to the degree of
price stickiness. Setting θ =0 .5 results in λ =0 .138 and a policy that sets a larger
weight on output gap stabilization (
√
0.138 × 4=1 .48).
< Figure 3 >
BG07 argue that the optimal policy choice depends crucially on the degree of real
wage stickiness. Figure 4 veriﬁes this claim by letting the degree of real wage stickiness
vary between η =0and η =0 .9. The larger the real wage stickiness, the larger is
the cost-push shock, and the larger is the sacriﬁce ratio as a relatively larger drop in
labor demand and output is necessary to engineer the required drop in real wages that
stabilizes the real marginal cost and inﬂation. The central bank will tend to be more
concerned with inﬂation stabilization and λ will be smaller when η is high. Assuming
η =0 .9, Figure 4 shows that, for our baseline calibration, λ =0 .002 (
√
0.002×4=0 .18).
< Figure 4 >
4.2 Analyzing the trade-oﬀ
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate the transmission of a persistent oil price shock to the economy
under diﬀerent assumptions on elasticities by comparing the natural, FPWE allocation
that implies strict inﬂation targeting, to the one implied by the optimal precommitment
policy. Figure 5 assumes Cobb-Douglas technologies and shows that in this case the
optimal policy replicates the FPWE allocation perfectly; the dashed and solid lines
are on top of each other. The divine coincidence holds as policy can perfectly stabilize
both the welfare relevant output gap and core inﬂation.
Figure 6 is based on the baseline calibration and contrasts strict inﬂation targeting
17When the NKPC is ﬂat, a large change in output is required to aﬀect inﬂation.
18The traditional Taylor rule that places equal weights on output stabilization and inﬂation stabi-
lization would imply λ =1 /16 with quarterly inﬂation.
16with optimal policy. Assuming low substitution (δ = χ =0 .3), a policy trade-oﬀ
appears. The responses under the optimal policy diﬀer quite substantially from those
under strict inﬂation targeting. While the latter implies an increase in real interest
rates (which corresponds to the expected growth of future consumption), the optimal
policy recommends a temporary drop for one year following the shock. Consequently,
t h ed r o pi no u t p u to ni m p a c ti sm o r et h a nt h r e et i m e sl a r g e ri nt h eF P W Ea l l o c a t i o n ,
which is the price for stabilizing core inﬂation perfectly.
< Figure 5 >
< Figure 6 >
Finally, Figure 7 shows how acute the policy trade-oﬀ is by displaying the diﬀerences
in both the welfare relevant output gaps and inﬂation reactions to a 1-percent increase
in the price of oil under optimal policy and strict inﬂation targeting. The "oil-in-
production-only" case (dotted line) is compared with the case where energy is an input
to both consumption and production (solid line). In both cases, optimal policy lets
inﬂation increase and the welfare relevant output gap decrease. But the diﬀerence with
strict inﬂation targeting is three times as large when oil is both an input to production
and consumption, as could be inferred from Section 3.
< Figure 7 >
5S i m p l e r u l e s
Optimal monetary policy plans may not be very transparent, nor easy to communi-
cate, as they rely on the real-time calculation of the welfare relevant output gap, an
abstract, non-observable theoretical construct. Therefore, accountability-related issues
could be raised, which may cast doubt on the overall credibility of the assumption of
precommitment that underlies the analysis.
As an alternative, some authors (McCallum, 1999, Söderlind, 1999, and Dennis,
2004) have advocated the use of simple optimal interest rate rules. Those rules should
approximate the allocation under the optimal plan but should not rely on an over-
stretched information set. In what follows, I ﬁrst derive such a rule analytically and
show that it is based on core inﬂation and on current and lagged deviations of output
and the real price of oil from the steady state.
As the mere notion of steady state can also be subject to uncertainty in real-time
policy exercises, I then show that the optimal simple rule can be approximated by a
17’speed limit’-type interest rate rule (see Walsh, 2003 and Orphanides and Williams,
2003) that relies only on the rate of change of the variables, i.e., on current core
inﬂation, oil price inﬂation, and the growth rate of output, and that this rule remains
close to optimal even when real wages are sticky.
5.1 The optimal precommitment simple rule
Using the minimal state variable (MSV) approach pioneered by McCallum (1999b), one
can conjecture the (no bubble) solution to the dynamic system relating the optimal
allocation under the timeless perspective optimal plan, equation (A23), and the private-
sector relation between the welfare relevant output gap and (core) inﬂation, equation
(A27) (see Appendix II) and get:
πy,t = α11xt−1 + α12μt, (25)
xt = α21xt−1 + α22μt, (26)
where αij for i,j =1 ,2 are functions of β, ky,a n dλ.
Combining (25) and (26) with the Euler equation (4), I then solve for rt, the nominal




11 πy,t + Ωyt − Γyt−1 +( Ξ + ΨΩ)pot − ΨΓpot−1, (27)
for Φ ≡ ρo−σα22α
−1
12 (1 − ρo), Ω ≡ α11+σα21, Γ ≡ Φ+σα21 and Ξ ≡ (ρo − 1)
³
j ωoc
1−j ωoc − Ψσ
´
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The optimal interest rate rule is a function of core inﬂation, current and lagged
output, and current and lagged real oil price, all taken as log deviations from their
respective steady states. Its parameters are functions of households preferences, tech-
nology, and nominal frictions.
For a permanent shock, ρo =1 , the rule simpliﬁes to
rt = α
−1











as Φ =1 ,a n dΞ =0 .L o o k i n g a t Γ and Ω shows that the closer α11 is to 1,t h e
more precisely a speed limit policy (a rule based on the rate of growth of the variables)
replicates the optimal policy.
18In the next section I show that for ρo =0 .95, a degree of persistence which cor-
responds closely to the 1979 oil shock (see Section 6), the speed limit policy still
approximates almost perfectly the optimal feedback rule despite a value of α11 clearly
below 1.
5.2 Optimized simple rules
The analytical solution to the kind of problem described in Section 5.1 rapidly becomes
intractable once one considers a vector of shocks or once the number of lagged state
variables is increased (e.g., by allowing for the possibility of real wage rigidity). An
alternative is to resort to a numerical approach that would search within a predeter-
mined space of simple interest rate rules for the one that minimizes the central bank
loss function, and to compare the loss under the optimal plan and the proposed simple
rule (Söderlind, 1999 and Dennis, 2004).
Because diﬀerent combinations of output gaps and inﬂation variability could, in
principle, produce the same welfare loss, I follow a diﬀerent strategy here. My goal
is to ﬁnd a simple rule that mimics the optimal plan along all relevant dimensions,
and where the success criterion is the rule’s ability to produce the same real allocation
after an oil shock. I then rely on a distance minimization algorithm deﬁned over the
n impulse response functions of m variables of interest to the policymakers. More
speciﬁcally, the algorithm searches the space of (monetary policy) parameters for the




0 (IRFSR(ϑ) − IRFO),
where IRFSR(ϑ) is an mn×1 vector of impulses under the postulated simple interest
rate rule, and IRFO is its counterpart under the optimal plan. The algorithm matches
the responses of eight variables (output, consumption, hours, headline inﬂation, core
inﬂation, real marginal costs, and nominal and real interest rates) over a 20-quarter
period using constrained versions of the following general speciﬁcation of the simple
interest rate rule
rt = gππy,t + gyyt + gy1yt−1 + gpopot + gpo1pot−1 + gw1wt−1,( 2 8 )
where ϑ =( gπ,g y,g y1,g po,g po1,g w1)
0.
I start with a version of the model that assumes perfect real wage ﬂexibility and run
the minimum distance algorithm on an unconstrained version of equation (28) and on a
19speed limit version where gy +gy1 =0 , gpo+gpo1 =0 , gw1 =0and gy,g po ≥ 0.F i g u r e8
shows the response to a 1 percent shock to oil prices under the optimal precommitment
policy (solid line), the optimized simple rule (OR, dotted line) and the speed limit rule
(SLR, dashed line). The responses under the OR stand exactly on top of the ones
under the optimal policy, which is not surprising given that an analytical solution to
the problem can be derived (see previous sub-section). More remarkable, however, is
how well the speed limit rule (dashed line) is able to match the optimal precommitment
policy (solid line). For most variables they are almost indistinguishable.
The coeﬃcients of the diﬀerent rules are reported in Table 1. They are quite large
compared to the coeﬃcients typically found for Taylor-type interest rate rules, but they
are not unusual when compared to the literature on optimal simple rules (McCallum
and Nelson, 2005). Both the OR and the SLR would react strongly to demand shocks
that push inﬂation and the output gap in the same direction, but they imply quite a
balanced response to cost-push shocks.
< Figure 8 >
How robust are these ﬁndings to the assumption of real wage stickiness? I assume
η =0 .9 and run the minimal distance algorithm again. Figure 9 shows that, again,
the OR (dotted line) is almost on top of the optimal plan benchmark (solid line). The
speed-limit policy that sets gy +gy1 =0 , gpo +gpo1 =0 , gw1 =0 ,a n dgy,g po ≥ 0 seems
to be a good approximation to the optimal precommitment simple rule in this case too.
< Figure 9 >
The estimated parameters (see Table 1, OR_W) show that the monetary authorities
react strongly to both inﬂation and the output gap (deﬁned as deviation from steady
state), but also to changes in oil prices. This means that the rules tends toward perfect
prices stability in the case of a demand shock, but acknowledge the trade-oﬀ in the
case of an oil price shock.
< Table 1 >
Following a suboptimal rule can be costly in periods of large oil shocks. In the next
section I revisit the 1979 oil shock to quantify these costs using a welfare criterion.
6 1979 oil price shock and US monetary policy
All US recessions since the end of World War II – and the latest vintage is no exception
– have been preceded by a sharp increase in oil prices and an increase in interest
20rates.19 But are US recessions really caused by oil shocks, or should the monetary
policy responses to the shocks be blamed for this outcome? Empirical evidence seems
to suggest a role for monetary policy (Bernanke et al. 2004), but its importance remains
diﬃcult to assess.
One major stumbling block is the role of expectations. To evaluate the eﬀect of
diﬀerent monetary policies in the event of an oil price shock one has to take into account
the eﬀect of those policies on the agents’ expectations, which is typically not feasible
using reduced-form time series models whose estimated parameters are not invariant
to policy (see Lucas 1976, and Bernanke et al. 2004 for a discussion in the context of
an oil shock).
An alternative approach is to rely on a structural, microfounded model to analyze
the implications of diﬀerent monetary policies for output, inﬂation, and welfare in a
precisely deﬁned experiment. Since increases in oil prices are particularly challenging
for central banks when they are both large and persistent, I have chosen to look at the
1979 oil shock resulting from the Iranian revolution.20 In one year, oil prices increased
by 126 percent in real terms and did not return to their preshock level before 1986.
During this period, the three-month Treasury bill rate rose from 6.7 percent in June
1978 to 15.3 percent in March 1980, and economic activity slumped with a trough of
−7.8 percent quarter-on-quarter real GDP growth in the second quarter of 1980.21
Could another monetary policy have improved this dismal outcome? One way to
answer this question is simply to compare the courses of real activity and inﬂation
under diﬀerent monetary policy rules for an oil price shock similar to the 1979 episode.
6.1 Dynamic analysis under diﬀerent policies
Figure 10 below shows that an AR(1) process pot = ρopot−1 + εo,t for ρo =0 .95 and a
shock εo,t that leads to a 100 percent log-increase on impact in the real price of oil is
very close to the 1979-1986 historical pattern.
< Figure 10 >
The model baseline calibration assumes that US monetary policy can be described
by a traditional Taylor rule based on headline inﬂation (HTR henceforth) with coef-
ﬁcients gπ =1 .5 on headline inﬂation and gy =0 .5 on the deviation of output with
19See Hamilton (2009) for a recent analysis.
20This oil shock was clearly exogenous to economic activity and as such corresponds perfectly to
the model deﬁnition of an oil price shock.
21This is based on chained 2000 dollars (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
21respect to steady-state output as in Taylor (1993).22 Admittedly, the HTR is only a
rough approximation of the actual Federal Reserve behavior, but it seems suﬃciently
accurate to describe how US monetary policy has been conducted on average over the
last three decades, and in particular during the oil shock of 1979 (see Orphanides 2000).
Before turning to counterfactual experiments with alternative monetary policies,
it is important to check the empirical properties of the model against the available
empirical evidence. The following simulations are made under the baseline calibration
where I also follow BG07 in setting the parameter governing the degree of real wage
stickiness η,t o0.9. Figure 11 shows the response of the model economy to a 1979-like
100 percent log increase in oil prices, where the dashed line represents the response
under the baseline HTR calibration. In this case, the shock leads to a −8 percent drop
in output on impact, a 1000 basis point tightening of the three-month nominal interest
rate and a 7.4 percent pickup in headline inﬂation implying a cumulated 9 percent
increase in the price level after two years.
Although the responses might seem somewhat excessive, they are in the same ball-
park as the existing VAR evidence on the transmission of oil shocks to the economy.23
To be sure, the lag structure of the structural model is too simple to reproduce the
VARs’ hump-shaped responses. But its quantitative predictions under the baseline
HTR calibration are close enough to their empirical counterparts to serve as meaning-
ful benchmark when discussing alternative monetary policies.
Figure 11 also compares the responses under optimal policy (OR henceforth, solid
line) and the traditional Taylor rule (HTR, dashed line). The top two panels show the
responses of the welfare relevant output gap and core inﬂation, the two determinants
of the central bank’s loss function. Under optimal policy, the central bank credibly
commits to a state-contingent path for future interest rates that involves holding real
interest rates slightly above what would be justiﬁed by output gap and inﬂation consid-
22Our benchmark Taylor rule is based, as in Taylor (1993), on annual inﬂation measured as the rate
of price changes between t − 3 and t (for quarterly observations), and the ouput gap deﬁned as the
deviation of output from its long-run trend.
23Following a 100 percent increase in oil prices, the maximal eﬀect on real GDP is supposed to lie
somewhere between −4 and −11 percent, depending on the identiﬁcation and the measurement of
the oil price shock. For example, Bernanke et al. (2004) ﬁnd a maximal drop of US real GDP of −7
percent four quarters after the shock. As for prices, the uncertainty is comparable, with estimates
ranging from a cumulated increase of 1 percent (in Bernanke et al. 2004) to 8 percent (Blanchard and
Galí 2007) two years after the shock. There are also discrepancies between the diﬀerent estimations
of the monetary policy reactions. Carlstrom and Fuerst (2005) ﬁnd a maximal increase of 500 basis
points three quarters after the shock, while Bernanke et al. (2004) ﬁnd an increase of 1500 basis
points.
22erations in the next ﬁve years. In so doing, it is able to dampen inﬂation expectations
without having to resort to large movements in real interest rates, and therefore it
reaches a much better outcome in terms of both inﬂation and the output gap in the
s h o r tt om e d i u mr u n . A tt h ep e a k ,o u t p u tf a l l st w i c ea sm u c ha n dc o r ei n ﬂation is
ﬁve times larger under HTR than under OR. Because inﬂation never really takes oﬀ
under OR, nominal interest rates remain practically constant over the whole period.
This ﬁrst result suggests that, if monetary policy had been conducted according to OR
during the oil shock of 1979, the recession would not have been averted but it would
have been much milder with almost no increase of core inﬂation beyond steady-state
inﬂation.
Many observers, including the US Federal Reserve, have emphasized core inﬂation as
a guide to monetary operational decisions.24 In Figure 11, I represent this alternative
by a Taylor rule based on core inﬂation (CTR henceforth, dotted line). Looking at
the consequences for output and the output gap only, it seems that such a rule is
preferable to the HTR and is indeed also preferable to the OR, for it would imply less
contraction in real activity over the whole ﬁve-year period. In the context of the 1979
oil shock, a CTR would have led to a 2 p e r c e n td r o pi no u t p u to ni m p a c t( i n s t e a do f4
percent with the OR and 8 percent with HTR). Still, as the upper right panel clearly
shows, the inﬂation cost of this policy would have been large. Core inﬂation would
have risen almost as much as under the HTR for about a year after the shock and
would have remained elevated throughout. Assuming some degree of inertia (ρ =0 .8)
brings HTR closer to CTR, but the general pattern of responses, if smoother, remains
largely unchanged. HTR continues to imply too much variation in both output and
inﬂation, and CTR leads to more inﬂation compared to OR, which is the price for a
more accommodating monetary policy.
< Figure 11 >
Some authors (Bernanke et al. 1999) have argued that monetary policy should
be framed with respect to a forecast of inﬂation rather than realized inﬂa t i o no nt h e
grounds that the former approach is better able to deal with supply-side shocks im-
plying a temporary trade-oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂation and the output gap. And,
indeed, many inﬂation-targeting central banks communicate their policy by referring
to an explicit goal for their forecast of inﬂation to revert to some target within a spec-
24Although they usually acknowledge that it may be sensible to express longer-run objectives in
terms of headline inﬂation.
23iﬁed period. Like BEG08, I deﬁn eaf o r e c a s t - b a s e dr u l ea saT a y l o r - t y p er u l ew h e r e
realized inﬂation has been replaced by a one-quarter-ahead forecast of core or headline
inﬂation; the parameters remain the same with gπ =1 .5 and gy =0 .5.
Figure 12 illustrates the implications of forecast-based rules and compares them
with the optimal rule in the context of the 1979 oil price shock. In the long term,
forecast-based rules fulﬁll their goal of stabilizing both headline and core inﬂation.
In the shorter run, however, they appear to be much more accommodative than the
O R .A st h eo i lp r i c es h o c ki st e m p o r a r y ,o i lp r i c ei n ﬂa t i o nw i l lb en e g a t i v en e x tp e r i o d ,
which pushes down headline inﬂation due to the direct eﬀect of energy costs on the CPI.
A Taylor rule based on a forecast of headline inﬂation would have (almost) completely
eliminated the output consequence of the 1979 oil shock, as can be seen in the upper
left panel, but with dire eﬀects on inﬂation in the short to medium run, as shown on
the upper right panel where core inﬂation remains at about 3 percent above target for
two years after the shock with a peak at 4 percent one year after the shock. Compared
to the benchmark HTR policy in Figure 12, this is 50 percent more inﬂation!
< Figure 12 >
6.2 Welfare costs from suboptimal policies
Having characterized the responses of macroeconomic variables under popular alter-
native monetary policies, I will devote the rest of this section to quantifying the costs
involved when following those suboptimal policies. Table 2 summarizes the main re-
sults.25 Its ﬁrst column shows the cumulative welfare loss from following alternative
policies for 1979 Q1 to 1983 Q4 expressed as a percent of one year steady-state con-
sumption. The second and third columns report the λ-weighted decomposition of the
loss arising from volatility in the output gap or in core inﬂation. The numbers seem to
be unusually large. They are about 100 times larger than the ones reported by Lucas
(1987). However, it must be kept in mind that our calculation refers to the cumulative
welfare loss associated with one particularly painful episode, and not the average cost
from garden variety oil price shocks where the cost of severe oil price increases would
be diluted in long periods of very low volatility. Indeed, Galí et al. (2007) reckon
25Note that our calibration implies a relatively low λ, which means that policymakers attribute a lot
of importance to minimizing the distortions associated with high inﬂation. Thus, despite the policy
trade-oﬀ that emerges following an oil price shock, a policy that stabilizes inﬂation will tend to be
favored over a policy that stabilizes the welfare relevant output gap.
24that the welfare costs of recessions can be quite large.26 Their typical estimate for
the cumulative cost of a 1980-type recession is in the range of 2 to 8 percent of one
year steady-state consumption, depending on the elasticities of labor supply and of
intertemporal substitution.27
< Table 2 >
The message arising from the welfare calculations is in line with the dynamic analy-
sis as shown by the IRFs. Table 2 shows that because of their inﬂationary consequences,
forecasting rules are particularly costly. For example, despite a very good performance
in terms of the output gap, forecast-based HTR has the worst result among the rules
considered because of higher core inﬂation. Taylor rules based on contemporaneous
headline inﬂation are also quite costly if there is no inertia in interest rate decisions.
The results suggest that, having followed a policy closer to the benchmark Taylor
rule (HTR) during the 1979 oil shock instead of the optimal policy may have cost the
equivalent of 2.1 percent of one year steady-state consumption to the representative
household. The overall cost would have been 40 percent smaller if monetary policy had
been based on an inertial interest rate rule such as CTR or HTR with ρ =0 .8.
As mentioned above, our utility-based welfare metric tends to weigh heavily inﬂa-
tion deviations as a source of welfare costs. Assuming θ =0 .75 and η =0 .9 amounts
to setting λ to 0.02, which means that the central bank attributes about twice as much
importance to inﬂation stabilization as to output gap stabilization when inﬂation is
expressed in annual terms.28 This notwithstanding, the results suggest that welfare
losses under the perfect price stability policy are three times as large as under opti-
mal policy and amount to 1.8 percent of one year steady-state consumption due to
disproportionately large ﬂuctuations in output.
26Once one recognizes the distorted nature of the steady state, ﬁrst-order welfare costs due to
business cycle ﬂuctuations must be taken into account. When studying a particular recessionary
episode, these ﬁrst-order welfare costs are not averaged out and can be quite large.
27They also aknowledge that their estimates are probably a lower bound as they ignore the costs of
ﬂuctuations in price and wage inﬂation resulting from nominal rigidities.
28This is not an unusual result. New Keynesian models typically attribute a much larger cost to
ineﬃciencies in the composition of output due to relative price distort i o n sw h e np r i c e sa r es t i c k y ,t h a n
to ineﬃciencies in the level of output. As allocative distortions get larger when inﬂation rises, monetary
authorities tend to assign a large weight to stabilizing inﬂation. As a basis of comparison, Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997) compute a value of λ equivalent to 0.003 when translated into quarterly units.
257 Time-varying elasticities of substitution
It is a well-know empirical fact that the demand for energy is almost unrelated to
changes in its relative price in the short run. In the long run however, persistent
c h a n g e si np r i c e sh a v eas i g n i ﬁcant bearing on the demand for energy. Pindyck and
Rotemberg (1983), for example, report a cross-section price elasticity of oil demand
close to one.
How are the result of the precedent sections aﬀected by the possibility of time-
varying elasticities of substitution. Is the short run monetary trade-oﬀ after an oil
price shock the mere reﬂection of some CES-related speciﬁcity, or is it a more general
argument related to low short-term substitutability in a distorted economy ?
To allow for time-varying elasticities of substitution, I transform the production
processes of Section 2 by introducing a convex adjustment cost of changing the input
mix in production. More speciﬁcally, I follow Bodenstein et al. (2007) and redeﬁne




























The variables ϕOY,t and ϕOC,t represent the costs of changing the oil intensity in
the production of the core good and the consumption basket, and are supposed to take























This speciﬁcation allows for oil demand to respond quickly to changes in output and
consumption, while responding slowly to relative price changes. In the long-run, the
elasticity of substitution is determined by the value of δ and χ. Although somewhat ad
hoc, this form of adjustment costs introduces a time-varying elasticity of substitution
for oil, an important characteristic of putty-clay models such as in Atkeson and Kehoe
26(1999) or Gilchrist and Williams (2005).29 The presence of adjustment costs transforms
the static cost-minimization problem of the representative intermediate ﬁrms and ﬁnal
consumption goods distributors into forward-looking dynamic ones. They can be re-
garded as choosing contingency plans for OY,t, Ht, OC,t,a n dCY,t that minimize their
discounted expected cost of producing Yt and Ct subject to the constraints represented
by equations (29) to (32).
Ic a l i b r a t eϕOY and ϕOC such that the instantaneous price elasticities of demand
for oil correspond to the baseline calibration chosen in the CES setting of the previous
sections Namely, the short-term elasticities of substitution are set to 0.3.I nt h el o n g
run, I assume a unitary elasticity of substitution (δ = χ =1 )s u c ht h a t( 2 9 )a n d( 3 0 )
are de facto Cobb-Douglas functions when t →∞ .
Figure 13 shows impulse responses to a 1 percent shock to the price of oil in the
ﬂex-price equilibrium and according to the optimal precommitment policy when there
is no steady-state distortion. Because of the adjustment costs – which add two state
variables to the problem – the IRFs are not exactly similar to the ones obtained under
CES production (see Figure 6) However, the main message remains the same: price
stability is the optimal policy in an eﬃcient economy.
Figure 14 performs the same exercise but allows for the same degree of monopolistic
competition as in previous sections (leading to a 20 percent net markup of core prices
over marginal costs). Again, it shows that allowing for time-varying elasticities of
substitution (converging to Cobb-Douglas in this case) does not aﬀect this paper’s
main ﬁnding: in a distorted equilibrium, an oil price shock introduces a signiﬁcant
monetary policy trade-oﬀ if the elasticity of substitution is lower than 1 in the short
run.
< Figure 13 >
< Figure 14 >
8C o n c l u s i o n
Most inﬂation targeting central banks understand their mandate to be ensuring long-
term price stability. Following an oil price shock, however, none of them would be ready
to expose the economy to the type of output and employment drops recommended in
29In putty-clay models of energy use, a large variety of types of capital goods are combined with
energy in diﬀerent ﬁxed proportions, making the short-term elasticity of substitution low. In the longer
run, the elasticity goes up as ﬁrms invest in capital goods with diﬀerent ﬁxed energy intensities.
27standard theory to stabilize prices in the short term.
This paper has shown that the contrast between theory and practice can be ex-
plained by the type of restrictive assumption to technology and preferences typically
made in the New Keynesian literature. In particular, increases in oil prices imply a
meaningful monetary policy trade-oﬀ between stabilizing output and stabilizing inﬂa-
tion once it is acknowledged (i) that oil cannot be easily substituted by other factors
in the short run, (ii)t h a tt h e r ei sn oﬁscal transfer available to neutralize the steady-
state distortion due to monopolistic competition, and (iii) that oil is an input both to
production and to consumption (via the impact of the price of crude oil on the price of
fuel, heating oil, and electricity). In this case, policies that perfectly stabilize inﬂation
entail signiﬁcant welfare costs, which may explain the reluctance of policymakers to
enforce them.
Interestingly, I ﬁnd that the optimal monetary policy response to a persistent in-
crease in oil price resembles the typical response of inﬂation targeting central banks.
While long-term price stability is ensured by a credible commitment to keep inﬂation
and inﬂation expectations in check, short-term real rates drop right after the shock to
help dampen real output ﬂuctuations. By managing expectations eﬃciently, central
banks can improve on both the ﬂexible price equilibrium solution and the recommen-
dation of simple Taylor rules.
This ﬁnding, however, is based on the assumptions that monetary policy is per-
fectly credible and transparent and that agents and the central banks have the right
(and the same) model of the economy. Further work should explore how robust these
policy conclusions are to the incorporation of imperfect information and learning in
the analysis.
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329 Appendix I : Deriving a quadratic loss function
The policy problem originally deﬁned as maximizing households utility can be rewritten
in terms of a quadratic loss function deﬁn e do v e rt h ew e l f a r er e l e v a n to u t p u tg a pyt−y∗
t
and core inﬂation πy,t. This appendix describes the steps involved following Benigno
and Woodford (2005) and Montoro (2007).
Second-order approximation of the model supply side























in log-deviations from steady state as
ht = yt − δ(wt − mct − pyt)+∆t
wt = ηwt−1 +( 1− η)(φht + σct)
where ∆t is the log deviation of the price dispersion measure 1
P∗
t from its steady state
and measures the distortion due to inﬂation. Note that these two log-linear equations
are exact transformations of the nonlinear equations.
Combining the labor demand and supply with a second-order approximation of the
real marginal cost
mct =( 1− f ωoy)[wt − pyt]+ f ωoy [pot − pyt]+
1
2





and a ﬁrst-order approximation of the demand for consumption (where the demand for









I obtain a second-order accurate equilibrium relation linking total hours to output and
the real price of oil













2 (1 − δ)








M ≡ [j ωoc(1−η)
σχ
sy − j ωoc






















1 − W ≡
j ωoy(1+(1−η)νδ)
1+j ωoy(1−η)νδ ,
J ≡ (1 − η)(σ + ν),
L ≡
(1−η)νδ
(1+(1−η)δνW)B − (1 + f ωoy (1 − η)νδ)(1+(1− η)A),
D =( 1− η)δW
j ωoy
(1−j ωoy).

















Benigno and Woodford (2004) demonstrate that ∆t – the log deviation of the price
dispersion measure – has a second-order approximation that depends only on second-



















.( A 2 )
Second-order approximation to NKPC
In this section I derive a second-order approximation to the NKPC, which can be used
to substitute out the term linear in yt in the second-order approximation to utility
when the steady state is distorted.
I start by writing a second-order approximation to the model inﬂation/marginal






























Taking a second-order approximation of the three preceding equations, I follow
Benigno and Woodford (2004) and Castillo et al. (2007) and express the NKPC as
Vt = kmct +
1
2










where I deﬁne the auxiliary variable Vt













and the linear expansion of zt







Using the ﬁrst-order30 approximation of ct and py,t and a second-order approxima-
tion of mct,Iw r i t e
mct = Wηwt−1 +( 1− η)(σ + ν)Wyt





(1 − f ωoy)
W







which I substitute in (A3) to get




















30A second-order approximation is not necessary here as these two variables enter multiplicatively
with mct.
35for
ky ≡ k(1 − η)(σ + ν)W
kp ≡ kB
cyy ≡ z(1 − η)
2 (σ + ν)
2 +2( 1− η)(σ + ν)(1− σ)W +( 1− η)
2 (σ + ν)
2 W2
cyp ≡ (1 − η)(σ + ν)W (Σ + B) − z(σ + ν)(1− η)L + B(1 − σ)
cpp ≡ zL2 +2 ΣB + B2
z ≡ 1−δ
1−j ωoyW2 (1 − W)
Σ ≡ σχj ωoc
sy − j ωoc
1−j ωoc.
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and ignoring all second-order terms.
Using the law of iterated expectation and (A2), equation (A4) can be rewritten as


















y kppo,t + 1
2k−1
y k(cyyy2











.( A 5 )
A second-order approximation to utility






t−to {u(Ct) − υ(Ht)}. (A6)






























for uy ≡ 1, uyy ≡ 1 − σ, uyp ≡− χj ωoc
sy (1 − σ) and t.i.p stands for terms independent of
policy.















Substituting (A1) and its square in (A9) and getting rid of variables independent
of policy, I obtain
v(Ht)=Hvh
½



























Now, since the technology is constant returns to scale, the share of labor in total
cost is equivalent to its share in marginal cost and the following equilibrium relationship
at the steady state
Y ucMC(1 − f ωoy)=Hvh,
which can be used to rewrite total utility Ut0 by substituting (A10) and (A8) into (A6),
to get


























Y − MC(1 − f ωoy)vy,
uyy = C







χ(1 − σ) − MC(1 − f ωoy)vyp




For the last step, substituting the expression (A5) for
P∞
t=t0 β
t−t0yt in (A11) obtains






































that can be rewritten equivalently as





















































y cyy−uyy,a n dw h e r eλ ≡
λy
λπy for λy = uyk−1
y kcyy −uyy and
λπy = uyk−1
y ε(1 + φW)−uπ. The output gap xt = yt−y∗
t is now the percent deviation
of output with respect to the welfare relevant output y∗





y cyp − uyp
kuyk−1
y cyy − uyy
po,t = −Ψpot.
The values of λy and λπy are functions of the model parameters and describe the
weights assigned by the central bank to stabilize the welfare relevant output gap and
core inﬂation. In what follows I summarize this information with λ ≡
λy
λπy,w h i c h
determines how concerned about the output gap a central bank should be after an
oil price shock. Typically, λ decreases with the sacriﬁce ratio and the degree of price
stickiness.
3810 Appendix II: Characterizing optimal policy
Following Woodford (2003)31, I circumvent the usual time consistency issues associated
with fully optimal monetary policies by assuming that the central bank is able to















subject to the following sequence of constraints
πy,t = βEtπy,t+1 + kyxt + μt (A21)
and a constraint on the initial inﬂation rate
πy,t0 = πy,t0, (A22)
where πy,t0 is deﬁned as the inﬂation rate in time t0 that is consistent with optimal
policy in a "timeless perspective" or, in other words, the inﬂation rate that would have
been chosen a long time ago and which is consistent with the optimal precommitment
plan.
Solving this problem under the timeless perspective gives rise to the following set
of ﬁrst-order conditions




which are supposed to hold for all t =0 ,1,2,3,...and which characterize the central
bank’s optimal policy response.
As shown in Section 3, acknowledging the low level of short-term substitutability
between oil and other factors gives rise to a cyclical distortion coming from the inter-
action between the steady-state eﬃciency distortion and the oil price shock. In terms
of the model equations, this cyclical distortion is translated into a cost-push shock that
enters the New Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC henceforth).
Taking a log-linear approximation of equation (19) around the zero inﬂation steady-
state yields the standard result that (core) inﬂation is a function of next period inﬂation
and this period real marginal cost: the NKPC
πy,t = βEtπy,t+1 + kmct,( A 2 4 )
31See Woodford (2003), chapter 7 for a discussion.






(1 − θβ) is the elasticity of inﬂation to the real marginal cost.
Substituting the labor market clearing level of the real wage into the real marginal
cost equation (16), we can rewrite (A24) as
πy,t = βEtπy,t+1 + kygapt,( A 2 5 )
where the output gap gapt = yt − yN
t measures the deviation between current output







for B ad e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no fδ and χ, the oil production and consumption elasticities
of substitution deﬁned in Appendix I.
But (A25) can be equivalently rewritten as
πy,t = βEtπy,t+1 + kyxt + μt,( A 2 7 )






the cost-push shock that arises as a direct function of the cyclical
wedge between the natural and the welfare maximizing level of output.
Obviously, the divine coincidence obtains when y∗
t = yN
t ,w h i c hi st h ec a s ef o r
χ = δ =1 , as shown in Section 3.
Appendix III : Deriving an optimal simple rule
In the timeless perspective equilibrium, inﬂation and the output gap behave according
to the rational expectation solution of the model consisting of the NKPC (A27) and
the policy rule (A23). Following McCallum (1999b) and McCallum and Nelson (2004),
the (no bubble) MSV solution takes the following form:
πy,t = α11xt−1 + α12μt (A31)
xt = α21xt−1 + α22μt,( A 3 2 )
where αij for i,j =1 ,2 are functions of β, ky and λ.
Because the supply of oil is supposed perfectly elastic at a given exogenous real
price, one can write the following deﬁnitions:
40ct − c
∗
t = yt − y
∗
t (A33)
πc,t = πy,t +
f ωoc
1 − f ωoc
(pot − pot−1) (A34)






rt − Etπy,t+1 −
f ωoc
1 − f ωoc











= −Ψσ(1 − ρo)pot.
Combining (A31), (A32), and (A35) leads to




rt − α11xt − α12ρoμt
− j ωoc
1−j ωoc (ρo − 1)pot − Ψσ(1 − ρo)pot
¶
+ α21xt + α22ρoμt,
which can be solved for rt :
rt =( α11 + σα21)xt − σα21xt−1 − (σα22 − α12ρo − σα22ρo)μt
+( ρo − 1)
µ
f ωoc






As shown from (A31), μt =
πy,t−α11xt−1





















πy,t +( α11 + σα21)yt − (Φ + σα21)yt−1
+( ( α11 + σα21)Ψ + Ξ)pot − (Φ + σα21)Ψpot−1
= Φα
−1
11 πy,t + Ωyt − Γyt−1 +( Ξ + ΨΩ)pot − ΨΓpot−1.
4111 Appendix IV: log-linearized economy
The allocation in the decentralized economy can be summarized by the following ﬁve
equations. Log-linearizing the labor supply equation (5) (and setting η =0for ﬂexible
real wages), the labor demand equation (14), and the real marginal cost (16), gives
equations (A41), (A42), and (A43). Substituting out oil consumption (7) in (3) and
making use of the overall resource constraint gives (A44). Finally, equation (A45) is
the log-linear version of (8) and describes the evolution of the ratio of core to headline
price indices as a function of the real price of oil in consumption units. Lowercase
letters denote the percent deviation of each variable with respect to their steady states






wt = φht + σct (A41)
ht = yt − δ(wt − mct − pyt)+∆t (A42)




pot + yt (A44)
pyt = −
f ωoc
1 − f ωoc
pot (A45)
where wt =l o g ( WtP
PtW) is the consumption real wage, pot =l o g (
Po,t
Po ) is the real oil price
in consumption units, pyt =l o g (
Py,t
Py ) i st h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo ft h ec o r eg o o d si nt e r m so f






is the share of oil in the real marginal cost,
f ωoc ≡ ωχ
ocP1−χ





χ is the share of
the core good in the consumption goods basket.
Also, the real marginal cost is equal to the inverse of the desired gross markup in the
steady state, itself determined by the degree of monopolistic competition as measured
by the elasticity of substitution between goods ε.S oMC = ε−1
ε in the steady state and
MC → 1 when ε →∞in the perfect competition limit.
4212 Tables
Table 1: Optimized simple rule (OR) and speed limit rules (SLR)
Simple rule gπ gy gy1 gpo gpo1 gw1
OR 5.123 4.742 −4.731 0.007 −0.014 -
SLR 5.101 4.742 −4.742 0.008 −0.008 -
OR_w (η =0 .9) 5.134 8.708 −7.884 0.276 −0.240 0.088
SLR_w (η =0 .9) 2.054 3.404 −3.404 0.096 −0.096 -
note:a l l c o e ﬃcients are consistent with annualized interest rates and
inﬂation
Table 2: Welfare costs under alternative policies (percent of annual consumption)
Policy Total Loss y Loss πy Loss
optimal 0.60 .40 .2
core Strict inﬂation target 1.81 .80
CTR 1.90 .21 .7
CTR inertia (ρ =0 .8) 1.70 .21 .5
Forecasting CTR 4.40 .24 .2
headline HTR 2.70 .42 .3
HTR inertia (ρ =0 .8) 1.70 .31 .4
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Figure 1: (YN) and eﬃcient (Ystar) output to a 1-percent increase in oil price as
a function of the production and the consumption elasticity of substitution (Chi);
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Figure 2: Response of the gap between natural (YN) and eﬃcient (Ystar) output to a
1 - p e r c e n ti n c r e a s ei no i lp r i c ea saf u n c t i o no ft h ed e g r e eo fm o n o p o l i s t i cc o m p e t i t i o n ;
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Figure 3: Change in the weight (Lambda) assigned to output gap stabilization as a
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Figure 4: Change in the weight (Lambda) assigned to output gap stabilization as a
function of the elasticities of substitution (Delta) and the degree of real wage rigidity
(eta)
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−3 REAL INTEREST RATE
Figure 5: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent increase in oil price; comparison of
optimal precommitment monetary policy with ﬂexible price equilibrium; Cobb-Douglas
technology; baseline calibration.






































































Figure 6: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent increase in oil price; compari-
son of optimal precommitment monetary policy with ﬂexible price equilibrium; CES
technology with low elasticity (ψ = χ =0 .3); baseline calibration.







OUTPUT GAP: optimal policy−flexible price equilibrium
 
 










−4 CORE INFLATION: optimal policy−flexible price equilibrium
 
 
oil Y + C
oil Y
Figure 7: Tradeoﬀ magniﬁcation eﬀect; diﬀerence between optimal policy and FPWE
when oil is an input to production only (dashed line) and when oil is an input to both
production and consumption (solid line); baseline calibration.
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−3 REAL INTEREST RATE
Figure 8: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent increase in oil price; comparison of
optimal precommitment monetary policy with optimized simple rule and speed limit
policy; CES technology with low elasticity (ψ = χ =0 .3); baseline calibration.
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−3 REAL INTEREST RATE (yearly)
Figure 9: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent increase in oil price; comparison of
optimal precommitment monetary policy with optimized simple rule and speed limit
policy based on four quarters moving average of core inﬂation; CES technology with
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Figure 10: 1979 oil price shock and comparable AR(1) exogenous process for the real
price of oil; log scales
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Figure 11: Impulse response functions to a 1979-like 100% log-increase in oil price;
comparison of optimal precommitment monetary policy with simple Taylor rules based
on four quarters moving average values of core or headline inﬂation; baseline calibration;
real wage stickiness (η =0 .9).
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Figure 12: Impulse response functions to a 1979-like 100% log-increase in oil price;
comparison of optimal precommitment monetary policy with simple forecast based
Taylor rules; baseline calibration; real wage stickiness (η =0 .9).
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Figure 13: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent log-increase in oil price; time-
varying elasticities; comparison of optimal precommitment monetary policy with ﬂex-
ible price equilibrium; undistorted equilibrium.























































−3 REAL INTEREST RATE
Figure 14: Impulse response functions to a 1-percent log-increase in oil price; Time
varying elasticities; comparison of optimal precommitment monetary policy with ﬂex-
ible price equilibrium; distorted equilibrium (markup 20%).
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